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Abstract 
 
The healthcare domain faces considerable 
challenges due to the digitization of medical processes 
and routines. Information technologies are designed to 
enable physicians to treat more patients and to 
increase service quality and patient safety. Despite 
acknowledging the rapid digital transformation of 
healthcare, research often neglects whether physicians 
are actually able to effectively decide which technology 
to use in which setting and whether their technology 
use thus effectively enhances quality and safety. 
Literature on cognitive biases already looked broadly 
at related errors in judgment and action and 
questioned rational behavior. Nevertheless, 
overconfidence, being one of the most common 
cognitive biases, has barely been linked to the accurate 
adoption and use of technology by physicians. Against 
this background, this research-in-progress paper 
proposes a framework for conducting a mixed-methods 
study based on the particularities of overconfidence in 
healthcare. We invite future research to compare our 
approach with established theoretical frameworks in IS 
research. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Up to 40 percent of annual deaths in the United 
States are preventable [6]. Lethal errors happen in 
roughly 6 percent of hospital admissions [8, 9]. 
Literature shows that most preventable deaths are 
caused by social determinants [e.g., 35, 36]. However, 
no less important and representing an emphasis of this 
research-in-progress paper, many medical flaws and 
treatment inaccuracies occur due to cognitive biases, 
because physicians are susceptible to errors in 
judgment and decision-making [e.g., 11, 49]. When 
medical practitioners are selective about what they pay 
attention to, distorted thinking and cognitive biases 
occur. In the digital age, that also applies to their 
adoption and use of information technology (IT). 
A cognitive bias is an error in thinking, which 
results from the attempt to simplify information 
processing. It is defined as a systematic deviation from 
rationality, whereby inferences are drawn in an 
illogical fashion [30, 45, 2, 3, 27]. Cognitive biases are 
the reason why individuals often come up with 
divergent or even ‘wrong’ conclusions when 
processing and interpreting information about the 
world around them [25]. Although many cognitive 
biases serve an adaptive purpose as they allow to make 
sense of the world rather quickly, they often outplay 
well-considered but time-consuming decisions.  
Information Systems (IS) research acknowledged 
that human decision-making is one decisive area of 
interest in the IS domain [23]. This seems to be 
especially true for action-oriented biases such as 
overconfidence [16]. Pressing issues such as privacy, 
trust, and security, fuel academic interest in this 
respect. Because the body of psychological knowledge 
often facilitates to advance the discipline and to 
provide valuable recommendations for practitioners 
[16], our study seeks to continue progressing on that 
path. There is a huge opportunity for combining IS 
research with behavioral economics principles such as 
cognitive biases to shed light on technology use and to 
inform design science research. In particular, the 
growing area of NeuroIS demonstrates potential to 
bring explanatory power to cognitive effects [13]. 
Against this background, it is surprising that 
cognitive biases received only limited attention in the 
technology-related healthcare domain [16]. The 
massive amount of information available to physicians 
at the point they have to decide on whether or how to 
use a certain technology can lead to information 
overload, which can result in greater reliance on 
heuristics and greater susceptibility to biases. In fact, 
many studies already showed the influence of cognitive 
biases on erroneous decisions in other fields (e.g., 
aviation accidents [54]). Assessment tools have been 
applied to reduce shortcomings and to improve quality 
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[e.g., 64]. Bearing in mind those related findings and 
guidelines, we focus on the healthcare domain due to 
its high vulnerability to human failure. Since 
physicians’ errors can be fatal and costly [39, 32, 5, 
34], we strive to understand and to improve decisions 
regarding whether or how to use a certain technology 
in that occupation.  
We will focus on the occurrence of overconfidence, 
because it is considered one of the cornerstones that 
illustrate shortcomings in human information-
processing capacities, thereby marking human 
irrationality. It is associated with diagnostic 
inaccuracies or suboptimal management [49] and 
correlates with an underestimation of risk factors and 
tolerance to ambiguity [45]. Thus, understanding the 
impact of overconfidence on a physician’s decisions is 
a promising path illustrating how behavioral 
economics and IS research can travel together. 
As literature leads to the assumption that 
overconfidence might be a crucial cause of medical 
errors, which occurs in the form of biased calibration, 
biased precision of numerical estimates, and biased 
placement of performance, we pose the following 
research questions (RQs): 
 
RQ1: How does overconfidence affect the accurate 
adoption and use of technology by physicians? 
 
RQ2: How does overconfidence affect the medical 
errors made by physicians? 
 
Seeing the cognitive bias of overconfidence as an 
important area of interest when it comes to why and 
how physicians use technology, our work has four 
objectives: 1) to highlight the value to consider 
cognitive biases in the healthcare domain, 2) to show 
the benefits of linking technology adoption and use of 
physicians to overconfidence, 3) to present a research 
agenda on how to evaluate the influence of 
overconfidence on prevention, diagnosis, treatment, 
and rehabilitation, and 4) to guide future research. It is 
important to note that our paper thereby focuses on 
exceptions of daily medical practice, namely the times 
when cognitive processes fail while using technology, 
which implies that a medical action is missed or 
wrong. We expect that physicians have a high 
confidence in their technology use behavior, which 
leads to underappreciating the chance of medical errors 
due to inappropriate usage.  
The overall goal is both to highlight the practical 
implications of our findings to derive valuable 
recommendation for medical practice. Moreover, our 
work strives for understanding the impact of 
overconfidence on medical technological decisions to 
offer a theoretical contribution to advance the field.  
2. Theoretical background  
 
In our outline, the physicians’ technology adoption 
and use cover the whole band width of health 
technology and can easily be itemized into specific 
application scenarios (e.g., adoption and use of 
telemedicine or artificial intelligence software). 
 
2.1. Cognitive biases in the healthcare domain 
 
According to the paradigm of rational choice, 
people decide and act based on thorough cost-benefit 
analysis to maximize profits. The prerequisites for 
rational choices are that people 1) know exactly what 
they want and prioritize, 2) have a set of alternative 
courses of action, and 3) know the likelihood of the 
events which they include in their calculation of costs 
and benefits [62, 15]. It quickly becomes clear that this 
approach has a number of shortcomings and does not 
correspond properly to ‘real’ life. The most 
fundamental drawback is that no human knows 
everything, nor has s/he ideal mathematical methods. 
Homo sapiens, in contrast to Homo oeconomicus (aka 
Humans in contrast to Econs [57]), is unable to 
accurately identify all characteristics needed for an 
optimal decision. And even if s/he could: Calculating 
complex situations would take too long to make sense 
in an efficient manner. Knowledge deficits as well as 
restrictions in time and cognitive resources limit truly 
rational decision and action. 
This leads to the concept of bounded rationality. 
According to the paradigm of rational choice, a sub-
optimal calculation of costs and benefits is seen as 
irrational and obstructive for the realization of human 
goals [45]. However, the decision-theorist Herbert 
Simon (Nobel Prize 1978) was a pioneer to assume that 
choices are naturally bounded by a number of factors 
[e.g., 50, 51]. For instance, humans consider only few 
alternatives; usually only two (which he termed 
‘satisficing’). Moreover, they tend to value things they 
own more highly than the things they could achieve by 
changing action (‘endowment effect’). In addition, they 
tend to continue previous behavior even at 
considerable costs (‘status quo bias’). Having named 
just a few examples, it becomes clear that humans are 
happy with reasonably satisfactory solutions, even if 
there is a good chance that there is a much more 
favorable option [see for further insights 4, 60, 10, 21].  
So how do humans actually decide? Are humans 
bounded in the sense that they can no longer 
effectively choose what to do? Gigerenzer and his 
colleagues negate this attitude and assume that the 
rational consideration of all relevant factors at hand 
often brings no advantage [22, 19]. In many situations, 
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heuristic decision-making, based on a very narrow 
information base and following simple rules, is just as 
or almost as efficient as complex arithmetic operations 
– but much faster and cheaper. Heuristics focus on a 
few salient features that can be used to decide between 
alternatives. One of the most common heuristics is the 
awareness of past experiences (for instance due to 
‘framing’ or ‘anchoring’). Humans rate the popularity 
of things by how easily concerning information is 
retrievable from their memory (‘availability’ heuristic). 
Simple and fast procedures often prevail. 
However, simplistic rules of thumb do not always 
bring benefits. Literature demonstrates severe 
cognitive limitations when it comes to complex 
decisions (e.g., decision-making in the healthcare 
domain). Human behavior in complex systems falls 
short in particular by: 1) starting without sufficient 
prior analysis of the situation, 2) disregarding the 
positive and negative influences of most factors and 
measures, 3) focusing on immediate events while 
ignoring long-term and side effects, 4) the rigid belief 
to have the right method, 5) fleeing into new projects 
when things are about to go wrong or 6) taking more 
and more radical measures when things get out of hand 
[14]. This lesson is highly relevant to the healthcare 
domain. In particular, the physicians’ belief to have the 
‘right’ method (i.e., ‘overconfidence’) seems untenable 
against the background of the prevalence of biases. 
IS research acknowledged the relevance of human 
cognition and decision-making biases related to 
information systems [16, 23]. By providing a review of 
cognitive bias-related research in the IS discipline, 
Fleischmann et al. [16] revealed that the literature in 
this domain mainly concentrated on perception and 
decision biases (ibid.). They invited future research to 
be more diverse. Our work travels well with their idea 
to focus on action-oriented biases (e.g., 
‘overconfidence’).  
To sum up, many studies show the influence of 
cognitive biases on decision-making and provide 
valuable insights for the progress of our study. 
Although many cognitive biases serve an adaptive 
purpose as they allow to make sense of the world more 
quickly, they often outplay well-considered, but time-
consuming, decisions. The fact that there are various 
sensitive issues where an elaborate analysis and 
decision-making is required [such as choosing whether 
or how to use a certain technology for diagnosis or 
treatment, see e.g., 20], is a fruitful start to study the 
accuracy of physicians’ technology adoption and use. 
 
2.2. Overconfidence in the healthcare domain 
 
Based on a structured review by Saposnik and his 
colleagues [49], common cognitive biases associated 
with medical decisions are based on perception biases 
(such as ‘framing’ [e.g., 44, see also 7]) or stability 
biases (such as ‘anchoring’ [e.g., 52, see also 1]). 
Approaches considering action-oriented biases (such as 
‘overconfidence’) were also considered (c.f. Table 1). 
Action-orientated biases are a distinct subgroup within 
the category of decision biases [16]. Because 
premature decisions based on optimism without 
considering all relevant information are pressingly 
relevant for physicians as well, this paper seeks to 
further integrate action-oriented biases into the current 
debate.  
Overconfidence is considered one of the 
cornerstones that illustrate shortcomings in human 
information-processing capacities, thereby marking 
human irrationality. It occurs in case our reliance 
related to judgments, inferences, or predictions is too 
high when compared to the corresponding accuracy 
[45]. Overconfidence is associated with diagnostic 
inaccuracies or suboptimal management [49] and leads 
to overestimation, over-precision, and over-placement 
[40]. Additionally, it correlates with an 
underestimation of risk factors and a high tolerance to 
ambiguity. Table 1 sums up general findings on 
overconfidence, which are relevant for our work. 
 
Table 1: Preliminary literature on 
overconfidence 
Author (Year of 
Publication) 
Title Source 
Keren (1997) “On the calibration of 
probability 
judgments: Some 
critical comments 
and alternative 
perspectives” 
[31] 
Klayman et al. 
(1999) 
“Overconfidence: It 
depends on how, 
what, and whom you 
ask” 
[33] 
McGraw et al. 
(2004) 
“The affective costs 
of overconfidence” 
[37] 
Moore and Healy 
(2008) 
“The trouble with 
overconfidence” 
[40] 
Nandedkar and 
Midha (2009) 
“Optimism in music 
piracy: A pilot study” 
[42] 
Rhee et al. (2005) “I am fine but you 
are not: Optimistic 
bias and illusion of 
control on 
information security” 
[47] 
Tan et al. (2012) “Consumer-based 
decision aid that 
explains which to 
buy: Decision 
confirmation or 
overconfidence 
bias?” 
[55] 
Page 3854
  
Van der Vyver 
(2004) 
 
“The overconfidence 
effect and IT 
professionals” 
 
[59] 
Vetter et al. 
(2011) 
“Overconfidence in 
IT investment 
decisions: Why 
knowledge can be a 
boon and bane at the 
same time” 
[61] 
 
The three most typical forms of overconfidence are 
“(1) calibration, (2) the precision of numerical 
estimates, and (3) people’s placement of their own 
performance relative to others” [45:291]. They point at 
the fact that the subjective confidence exceeds 
objective accuracy, the subjective confidence intervals 
are too narrow, and people tend to better-than-average 
estimations of their own contribution or skills relative 
to others. Subjective confidence is based on self-
knowledge and helps make quick judgements, although 
objective quantities are unknown, unstructured or by 
other means rough [63]. Closely linked to 
overconfidence is the illusion of control as well as the 
stable individual trait of optimism [45].  
Overconfidence is also of interest for IS research. 
The domain studied the bias’s occurrence in many 
settings such as enterprise resource planning [e.g., 28], 
innovation management [e.g., 18], and performance 
[e.g., 41]. As technology use became ubiquitous in the 
healthcare domain, the number of studies concerning 
technology use for medical diagnoses and treatment 
began to rise. However, a comprehensive review of the 
available literature and current thinking related to these 
issues is missing in this discipline [16]. This hampers 
both theorizing and finding practical solution to 
improve the accuracy of medical decision making 
while using technology. 
Evidence suggests that the incidence of 
overconfidence is likely to be greater among top 
executives (ibid.). Physicians are without question seen 
as such experts who are ambitious, competent and 
obstinate. The benefits of overconfidence can be 
threefold for them [45:91 ff.]: First, it might have a 
consumption value of feeling good. People naturally 
enjoy receiving positive feedback, praise, and approval 
(also from thinking well of themselves). Second, it 
might have a motivation value. People with high 
confidence set high goals and persist in the face of 
adversary. Third, it might be a valuable signal for 
convincing others. Optimism about future events can 
positively affect those developments. A physician 
being overconfident about a particular treatment can be 
considered as the cause of a self-fulfilling prophecy or 
placebo effect. Against this background, it is of crucial 
importance to consider overconfidence, when the 
‘demigods in white’ decide on whether or how to use a 
certain technology. Table 2 sums up recent findings on 
clinicians’ overconfidence [see 49], also taking into 
account literature regarding the effect of 
overconfidence on medical errors. 
 
Table 2: Preliminary literature and current 
findings on clinicians’ overconfidence 
Author (Year of 
Publication) 
Title Source 
Friedman et al. 
(2005) 
“Are clinicians 
correct when they 
believe they are 
correct? Implications 
for medical 
decision support” 
[17] 
Meyer et al. 
(2013) 
“Physicians’ 
diagnostic 
accuracy, confidence, 
and resource 
requests: a vignette 
study” 
[38] 
Crowley et al. 
(2013) 
“Automated 
detection of 
heuristics and biases 
among pathologists 
in a computer-based 
system” 
[12] 
Saposnik et al. 
(2013) 
“Accuracy of 
clinician vs risk score 
prediction of 
ischemic stroke 
outcomes” 
[48] 
Stiegler et al. 
(2012) 
“Decision-making 
and safety in 
anaesthesiology” 
[53] 
Ogdie et al. 
(2012) 
“Seen through their 
eyes: residents’ 
reflections on the 
cognitive and 
contextual 
components of 
diagnostic errors in 
medicine” 
[43] 
Saposnik, et al. 
(2016) 
“Cognitive biases 
associated with 
medical decisions: A 
systematic review” 
[49] 
 
3. Model development  
 
Based on the theoretical background, we developed 
a preliminary research model. Overconfidence is 
considered as the independent variable. On the one 
hand, we propose a relation between overconfidence 
and technology use and seek to answer RQ1. On the 
other hand, we want to find out how overconfidence 
affects medical errors made by physicians to answer 
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RQ2. We integrate technology use as a moderating 
variable that affects the strength of the relationship 
between medical errors and overconfidence. It is 
expected to have an amplifying effect. We will test for 
the moderating relation in an analysis of variance, 
where it is represented by the interaction effect 
between the dependent variable and the factor variable. 
 
Figure 1: Model development 
 
4. Research design and data analysis  
 
Studying a complex decision in the healthcare 
domain offers tremendous potential. Because 
behavioral economic researchers rely mostly on 
experiments, it is a great opportunity to test their 
findings against other data [23]. As IS researchers have 
quite some knowledge in collecting and assembling 
observational datasets of technology adoption and use, 
these datasets provide a valuable source to fulfil this 
goal – also pointing at the potential of field 
experiments (e.g., in IT-mediated environments) to 
provide a middle ground between laboratories and 
observational data (ibid.). However, since there is no 
potential existing dataset to utilize, we propose a two-
step mixed-methods approach to answer our RQs.  
As noted above, physicians increasingly have many 
healthcare technologies at hand to decide whether or 
which one to use. Although there may be just one 
integrated healthcare information system for a hospital, 
especially resident physicians may have the luxury of 
multiple healthcare technologies. These can be various 
software, different possibilities for video consultation, 
sensor technology in medical devices or an integration 
of artificial intelligence (e.g., in the anamnesis of new 
patients). The multitude of technologies as well as their 
possible modes of operation is constantly increasing. 
Therefore, we do not want to commit to a specific 
technology in this work yet. However, the selection of 
a specific technology and a concrete application 
scenario is to be worked out in the proposed study 
directly at the beginning. 
In a first step, we hand out a short survey to a group 
of physicians. We thereby want to answer RQ1 (How 
does overconfidence affect the accurate adoption and 
use of technology by physicians?). Table 3 provides 
initial questions regarding the proposed survey. Please 
note that actual objective answers are not available, but 
also not necessary, as the subjective answers illustrate 
a specific percentile of the entire reference population 
(e.g., top half) which makes the comparison of the 
percentage of people who believe they are in this 
percentile with the percentile itself meaningful. 
 
Table 3: Sample questions for the later survey 
Concept Selection of questions 
Tolerance to technology-
related uncertainty 
[46] 
It is fine for me that… 
…there are always new 
developments in the 
technologies we use. 
…there are constant changes 
in computer software. 
…there are constant changes 
in computer hardware. 
Aversion to risk 
[24] 
I am a cautious person who 
generally avoids risk. 
I am very willing to take 
risks when choosing a job or 
project to work on. 
I usually play it safe, even if 
it means occasionally losing 
out on a good opportunity. 
Confidence in the 
appropriateness of 
technology adoption and use 
[adapted from 45] 
 
How high do you rate the 
correctness of a patient’s 
medical history created by 
artificial intelligence 
software?  
How likely is it that you 
integrate this information 
into your daily work 
routine? 
Confidence around 
numerical estimates of 
technology use 
[adapted from 45] 
In which year will the first 
fully electronic surgery take 
place? 
Placement on rankings  
[adapted from 45] 
To what extent are you 
taking advantage of 
telemedicine opportunities 
compared to your fellow 
colleagues? 
Do you think you finished 
your final exam in the top 
half of your class?’ 
 
The survey will be piloted with 50 respondents. Its 
items are adapted from the ones provided by Pohl [45]. 
Since our institute has a large network of doctors 
(outpatient and inpatient), we then aim to distribute the 
survey to at least 200 physicians of all disciplines. The 
specific discipline and the place of work (outpatient or 
inpatient) are controlled. First, we want to identify 
critical personality traits (e.g., tolerance to uncertainty, 
aversion to risk and ambiguity) and demographics. 
Second, we present questions pointing at 
overconfidence but disguise them as questions about 
general education and attitude (e.g., ‘Do you think you 
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finished your final exam in the top half of your 
class?’). Great exemplary questions are presented by 
Pohl and the collected authorship of his omnibus [45]. 
Because of the concealment, we will seek an ethical 
motion given by the University’s ethics committee. 
Successively, we will inquire 1) the mean confidence 
in the appropriateness of technology adoption and use 
(e.g., (I) ‘How high do you rate the correctness of a 
patient’s medical history created by artificial 
intelligence software? (II) How likely is it that you 
integrate this information into your daily work 
routine?’ (both questions rated on a Likert scale from 
1-7)), 2) the subjective confidence around numerical 
estimates of technology adoption and use (e.g., ‘In 
which year will the first fully electronic surgery take 
place?’), 3) the mean subjective placement on rankings 
(e.g., ‘To what extent are you taking advantage of 
telemedicine opportunities compared to your fellow 
colleagues?’ (on a Likert scale from 1-7)). These 
findings provide us a picture of the overall 
overconfidence among physicians as we expect that the 
physicians’ confidence on whether and how to use a 
certain technology exceeds objective accuracy, that 
their subjective confidence intervals are oftentimes too 
narrow, and that they tend to better-than-average 
estimations of their own contribution or skills relative 
to others. 
In a second step, we chose a qualitative research 
design as we seek to understand and interpret events 
from the perspective of the physicians involved. We 
thereby want to answer RQ2 (How does 
overconfidence affect the medical errors made by 
physicians?). First, we present a short film (3 min) 
about a typical treatment situation to each participant 
in which no medical mistakes are made. An 
interviewer discusses the presented situation in a semi-
structured manner and asks (subsequently implicitly 
and explicitly) about the occurrence of cognitive biases 
(e.g., overconfidence and illusion of control). Second, 
we present a short film (3 min) to the same person 
about an atypical treatment situation in which a 
medical mistake is made. Again, the interviewer 
discusses the presented situation and asks 
(subsequently implicitly and explicitly) about the 
occurrence of cognitive biases (e.g., overconfidence 
and illusion of control). Then, the physicians are 
thanked and debriefed. The interviews are seen as 
beneficial to understand how overconfidence can 
impact medical errors, focusing on the individual 
cognitive processes of each particular physician. We 
identified a selection of exemplary questions 
concerning our proposed scenarios (c.f. Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Sample questions for the later 
interview guide 
Concept  Selection of questions 
Overconfidence 
[among others adapted from 
38] 
 
How would you rate the 
likelihood of committing a 
medical error in this 
situation? 
How much would you rely 
on the presented technology 
when treating this patient? 
How would you rate the 
amount of risk factors? 
Do you feel that this 
situation is ambiguous? 
Optimism 
[adapted from 26] 
In this situation, …  
…the use of technology is 
enhancing our standard of 
treatment. 
…treatment will be easier 
and faster with technology. 
…technology is a fast and 
efficient means of getting 
information. 
…technology can eliminate 
a lot of tedious work. 
Illusion of control 
[adapted from 29] 
How would you rate the 
amount of control you have 
over this work situation? 
How would you rate the 
amount of control you have 
over your contribution to the 
well-being of this patient? 
 
The quantitative part of the study is analyzed using 
empirical social research methods. On the one hand, a 
confirmatory factor analysis is conducted to check 
whether the three expected subcategories of 
overconfidence (i.e. calibration, precision of numerical 
estimates, placement of performance) are reflected in 
the data. The relationships are further studied by 
executing univariate and multivariate regression 
analysis. Next, the qualitative part of the study will be 
audibly recorded and transcribed. The analysis consists 
of the identification of analysis units and the definition 
and coding of structured dimensions. The transcripts 
are interpreted independently by two researchers and 
finally checked for intercoder reliability. The analysis 
phase closes with a quantitative evaluation, a final 
interpretation, and a derivation of recommendations for 
actions from the analysis units.  
Figure 2 shows the proposed research agenda, the 
related RQ for each step and the sample as well as 
sample size. The first sample covers the physicians in 
the pilot test. The second sample encompasses the 
physicians in the actual survey.  
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Figure 2: Research agenda 
 
We keep in mind that overconfidence might depend 
on the sampling procedure and how performance is 
assessed [45]. Besides, the sampling procedure can be 
confounded with item difficulty and overconfidence 
can co-vary with item difficulty. Besides these 
potential limitations, the advantage of our mixed-
method study is that it provides a complete picture of 
the particularities of overconfidence and assumptions 
about the underlying mechanisms of technology 
adoption and use. The design is well suited to explain 
the physicians’ reality. It takes advantage of both 
methodological approaches and minimizes associated 
pitfalls. As a result, the qualitative results can be 
statistically generalized and the relevance and 
replicability of the quantitative findings can be 
increased. 
  
5. Concluding remarks on how to beat 
cognitive biases by design 
 
Against the background that the healthcare domain 
faces major changes and challenges, questions arise on 
whether physicians are able to effectively decide which 
technologies to use in which setting and whether their 
technology use subsequently enhances treatment 
quality and thus patient safety. Literature on cognitive 
biases broadly looked at errors in judgment and 
decision-making, while questioning rational behavior. 
However, overconfidence, being one of the most 
common cognitive biases, has barely been linked to the 
accurate adoption and use of technology by physicians. 
We proposed a mixed-methods study based on the 
particularities of overconfidence. The study’s main 
aims are to provide new insights that may affect patient 
outcomes (e.g., avoidable hospitalizations, 
complications related to a procedure, prevention of 
unnecessary tests or medication, etc.) and to help 
attenuate medical errors. To stress the importance of 
these aims, we briefly address the implications of our 
work. 
Theoretical implications. In order to provide a 
holistic view on the IS domain, we invite future 
research to further compare our findings with 
established theoretical frameworks in IS research (e.g., 
theory of planned behavior). This can also mean 
adding further variables to the model (e.g., perceived 
ease of use, perceived usefulness). Since most 
literature about technology adoption and use is based 
on the rational choice paradigm, our investigation has 
the potential to question and test human decision-
making and judgement. In addition, there is a chance 
that IS research and behavioral economics research 
travel together and learn from one another. Moreover, 
a theoretical direction is that the effects of biases can 
be manipulated by nudging humans in directions that 
will make their lives better and easier [58]. Thus, the 
nudge paradigm is seen as very promising in the 
healthcare domain, too, and opens the door for further 
question on the physicians’ technology adoption and 
use. Digital health solutions that incorporate nudges 
[e.g., interactive text-message reminders or haptic 
medication alerts, see 56] might create innovative 
pathways and can be studied as use cases.  
Implications for practice and design. As an 
outcome of our research, it can be discussed how 
technology can be designed to reduce overconfidence 
of physicians. Thus, future research can promote direct 
insights into how to design technologies for everyday 
medical practice to reduce medical errors. Future 
quantitative studies can objectify and embed these 
results. On top of that, future work is invited to review 
existing tools to reduce the occurrence of cognitive 
biases (e.g., checklists, cognitive calibration) to 
provide further recommendation on how to reduce 
overconfidence. When it comes to training and 
education for physicians, one can also think of new 
digital technologies such as augmented reality and 
virtual reality, which have a demonstrably positive 
effect on learning success. Since effective educational 
strategies are needed to overcome the effect of 
cognitive biases on medical judgement and decision-
making when adapting and using technology, 
prospective studies evaluating and comparing different 
training strategies are highly valuable. 
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